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TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
Mortgage Lending: When Does a Borrower’s Right to Rescind
a Mortgage Loan Under the Truth in Lending Act Expire?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Truth in Lending Act permits a borrower to rescind a loan secured by a mortgage on the borrower’s
principal residence by notifying to the lender within the first three days after the loan is made, or within
three days of receiving loan disclosure forms if those forms are not provided at closing. This right expires
three years after the loan is originated. In this case, the Court must decide whether that three-year limit
refers to notifying the lender of the decision to rescind, or to filing an actual suit for rescission.

Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans
Docket No. 13-684
Argument Date: November 4, 2014
From: The Eighth Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY

INTRODUCTION
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires that lenders make certain
disclosures to potential borrowers to ensure that borrowers have
the opportunity to understand the terms of the loan they are taking
and to shop for credit with full information. Section 1635(a) of
TILA provides a borrower with the right to rescind a loan secured
by the borrower’s principal residence before midnight on the third
business day after the loan is consummated “by notifying the
creditor, in accordance with regulations of the [Consumer Finance
Protection] Bureau, of his intention to do so.” However, to give
teeth to the act’s disclosure requirements, it provides that if the
borrower is not provided at closing with proper disclosures and
notice of the right to rescind, the deadline to rescind the transaction
is extended until three days after those materials are provided.
As originally passed, TILA did not include any time limit on the
borrower’s right to rescind if the lender did not comply with its
disclosure requirements. In 1974, however, Congress added section
1635(f), under which the right to rescind expires three years after
the consummation of the loan even if the lender has never provided
the required disclosures and forms. The courts of appeals have split
on the effect of section 1635(f), with the Third, Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits holding that it is enough if the borrower provides notice
of rescission before the right expires’ and the First, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits holding that if the lender objects to
rescission, the borrower must actually bring suit within that threeyear period.
The TILA rescission provisions were initially drafted with a primary
focus on home improvement scams and reflect the facts of such
cases rather than the mortgage loan issues that loom so large today.
Section 1635(b) of TILA provides a specific sequence of events for
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rescission. Within 20 days after receiving a notice of rescission, the
creditor must terminate its security interest in the property (the
mortgage). After this is done, the borrower must tender payment
of the debt to the creditor. The borrower has an absolute right to
rescind within the first three days after closing or receipt of the
required disclosures, and the prescribed sequence of actions fits
such rescissions well.
However, TILA does not directly address the possibility that
a creditor might contest the borrower’s right to rescind the
transaction nor explain how such disputes should be handled,
giving rise to the present controversy. The statute seems to
assume that every notice of intent to rescind will be justified and
a rapid nonjudicial remedy is therefore appropriate. So a single
set of rescission provisions essentially applies to two dramatically
different situations: uncontested rescissions (whether in the first
three days, or because the creditor concedes a TILA violation or
otherwise consents) and contested ones. Automatic and rapid
rescission is appropriate in the former case, and problematic in the
latter.

ISSUE
May a borrower rescind a mortgage loan for violation of the Truth in
Lending Act by sending a notice of rescission within the three-year
window provided by section 1635(f) and bringing suit thereafter if
the creditor objects, or must the borrower actually file suit within
that three-year period?

FACTS
On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski borrowed
$611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. to refinance their
mortgage. Exactly three years later, on February 23, 2010, they
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mailed a letter notifying the lender that they were rescinding the
loan because of violations of the Truth in Lending Act. (The alleged
violation was providing the borrowers with one copy of the Truth in
Lending Disclosure Statement and Notice of Right to Cancel, rather
than two copies as required by the governing regulations.) The
lender denied their demand to rescind the transaction, disputing
whether TILA had been violated, and on February 24, 2011, the
borrowers filed suit to rescind the loan and for damages for the
lender’s refusal to grant the rescission.

to suits for damages for violation of TILA, states that “any action
under this section may be brought … within one year from the date
of the occurrence of the violation.”

The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed
the suit because it was filed more than three years after the
consummation of the loan. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed, although two of the three judges specifically noted
that they did so only because they were bound by an earlier Eighth
Circuit case and that if the issue was still open in their circuit they
would have ruled for the borrowers. The Jesinoskis filed a petition
for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.

to exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall
notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram
or other means of written communication. Notice is
considered given when mailed, when filed for telegraphic
transmission or, if sent by other means, when delivered to
the creditor’s designated place of business.

CASE ANALYSIS
The Jesinoskis, petitioners before the Court, argue that they
rescinded the loan before the right of rescission expired because
the right is exercised by providing notice to the creditor, which
they did within the three-year period provided by section 1635(f).
Respondent argues providing notice of rescission does not
automatically result in rescission if the lender contests the right
to rescind, and that section 1635(f) is a statute of repose requiring
that any suit to rescind be filed within its three-year period.
Petitioners’ argument begins with the plain meaning of the words
of section 1635(a), which, they argue, unambiguously provide for
rescission to be accomplished by notice: “the obligor shall have
the right to rescind the transaction … by notifying the creditor, in
accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do
so.” Section 1635(b) specifies the further steps in the rescission
process, providing that within 20 days of receipt of the notice the
lender must cancel the mortgage. Once that is done, the borrower
must tender repayment of the loan to the lender. This provides
a simple, expeditious nonjudicial remedy for borrowers, under
which rescission is accomplished by notice, rather than a judicial
determination of a TILA violation.
In support, petitioners argue that section 1635 was “intended
to codify long-settled principles of rescission law,” under which
rescission could be accomplished by providing notice of the
rescission and returning any consideration to the other party. No
suit was required to rescind the transaction, although a suit might
have been needed after rescission to compel restitution from the
other side.
According to petitioners, section 1635(f), which provides that the
right to rescind “shall expire” after three years, does not change
the fact that rescission is accomplished by notice, without filing
suit, and does not establish any limitation on when such a suit
may be filed (provided the notice is given within the three years).
Petitioners contrast section 1635(f), which says that the “right of
rescission shall expire,” with the typical language used in a statute
of limitations, which will refer to the time limit for commencing an
action or filing a suit. For example, section 1640(e), which applies
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Moreover, petitioners argue, TILA expressly authorized the Federal
Reserve Board (and now the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
which took over responsibility after the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act) to enact implementing regulations. Regulation Z, adopted in
1969, provides that

Neither the statute nor the regulations state that the borrower
must bring suit in order to rescind. Petitioners argue that the
interpretation of TILA embodied in these regulations is a reasonable
one that is entitled to deference by the courts. Further, Congress
has repeatedly amended TILA in the forty years since Reg. Z was
adopted, including various amendments to the rescission provisions,
without ever changing the method of rescission set forth in section
1635(a), thereby acquiescing in the Board’s interpretation. In 1977,
for example, Congress considered but rejected an amendment to
create a cause of action “to determine the consumer’s right to
rescind”; in 1980 it narrowed the range of transactions in which
rescission rights were available, and in 1995 it expanded the use of
rescission as a defense in foreclosure proceedings. In none of these
enactments, however, did Congress amend the means of rescinding
(by notice to the creditor) laid out in section 1635(a) and Reg. Z.
Respondent argues that the regulations are entitled to no deference,
as they are at odds with TILA’s clear requirements. Further, the
regulations explain what is required to provide the notice of
intention to rescind under section 1635(a), but say nothing about
the acts a borrower must take to obtain resolution of a contested
rescission or when those acts must be taken.
Respondent agrees that TILA codifies common-law rescission but
disagrees on what that means. Under TILA, the borrower has an
unconditional right to rescind within three days of receiving the
statutory disclosures, but rescission after that depends on whether
the lender has violated TILA. Within the first three days after loan
documents are executed, rescission is simple and straightforward,
as laid out in sections 1635(a) and (b), particularly because loan
funds are normally not disbursed to the borrower until after the
three-day period has passed.
Rescission for a TILA violation, however, is “problematic” because
the funds have been disbursed, mortgage recorded, and the right to
rescind may be contested by the lender. If the lender contests the
right to rescind, respondent argues, the steps laid out in section
1635(b) “will not take place and must be established by judicial
resolution.” According to respondent, TILA “prescribes a different
procedure” in such cases, offering a cause of action under section
1635(g) in which a court may “award” rescission.
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Section 1635(g) states, in its entirety, that “[i]n any action in
which it is determined that a creditor has violated this section, in
addition to rescission the court may award relief under section 1640
of this title for violation of this subchapter not relating to the right
to rescind.” Petitioners argue that this language acknowledges
that rescission may be awarded by a court but, according to their
reading, it neither creates a cause of an action for rescission nor
requires that a borrower file suit in order to rescind. It simply allows
a court to award both rescission and damages if an action by the
borrower or a government agency results in a determination that
TILA was violated.
Respondent argues that the need for a judicial proceeding in order
for rescission to take effect over the lender’s objection is reinforced
by the common law, which recognized two means of rescission.
Rescission could be effected at law by unilateral notice and tender if
the other party did not contest the right to rescind. If the other party
objected, however, it was necessary to bring a judicial proceeding
for equitable rescission. Petitioners argue that Congress intended
to mirror rescission at law, but respondent claims that the actual
model was rescission at equity, as shown by (1) the separation of
notice and tender, both which were required for rescission at law;
and (2) section 1635(g), which provides that a court may award
rescission.
Respondent argues that while section 1635(a) provides for the
borrower to notify the lender of its “intention to rescind,” this does
not automatically result in rescission. Even under rescission at law,
the notice did not effectuate rescission absent tender of the benefits
received by the rescinding party (which is beyond most borrowers
unless and until the mortgage is voided). The rescission itself,
respondent argues, is accomplished either through the unwinding
of the transaction as laid out in section 1635(b)—including return
of the loan proceeds to the lender—or by an award of rescission
under section 1635(g).
Under section 1635(c), if a borrower has signed an
acknowledgement at closing that the required disclosures and
notices were received, there is a rebuttable presumption that this is
true. Such a presumption, respondent argues, has no effect outside
of litigation, showing that Congress envisioned litigation to resolve
contested rescission cases. Moreover, it would make no sense, in
the face of this presumption, to argue that a lender is subject to
automatic unilateral rescission upon notice from borrowers who,
like the petitioners here, have signed such an acknowledgement.
According to respondent, a contrary reading would give absurd
results, as a borrower could rescind by notice to the lender, who
would have to cancel the mortgage within 20 days even though
the lender does not agree that the borrower has a right to rescind.
Sending such a letter costs little or nothing to the borrower,
particularly if the loan is already in default and foreclosure, and
the sender is not subject to the sanctions available for groundless
lawsuits or defenses. Borrowers could send spurious rescission
notices within three years, keeping open the possibility of
bringing suit thereafter and forcing lenders to bring “avoidable
and unnecessary” declaratory judgment actions to establish the
enforceability of their loans.
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The unlimited duration of the rescission right, as TILA was initially
drafted, created just such a cloud on the “titles and enforceability
of loans,” as a result of which the three-year time limit in section
1635(f) was added. Respondent asserts that it is a statute of repose
that operates as an absolute bar because the right of rescission
is terminated, leaving no cause of action on which to file a suit.
Petitioner argues that this section merely requires that the borrower
send a notice of intent to rescind within the three-year period, and
that no cause of action exists unless and until a lender rejects a
borrower’s notice of rescission. It is that rejection which gives rise
to the basis for the suit, petitioners conclude, and thus triggers the
running of any statute of limitations.

SIGNIFICANCE
The majority of residential mortgage loans are sold in secondary
markets and the outcome of this case could affect the marketability
of mortgages, with ramifications for mortgage availability and
cost. The securitization industry argues that if a mortgage can be
automatically voided by the borrower’s notice of intent to rescind,
risks increase and interest rates will follow. Similarly, a ruling that
the three-year statute of repose is not an absolute bar and that a
notice of intent to rescind provided within that period will keep
the cause of action alive would affect values both by clouding the
lender’s rights and by increasing overall litigation costs. It should
be noted, however, that while the parties have tended to merge the
arguments, there is no inherent reason why the Court could not split
them, holding that the notice of intent to rescind does not cause an
automatic rescission where the lender contests it, and that section
1365(f) does not preclude a subsequent suit provided the notice is
sent within the three-year window.

Marshall Tracht is a professor of law at New York Law School. He
can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212.431.2139.
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Petitioners Larry D. Jesinoski and Cheryle Jesinoski (David
C. Frederick, 202.326.7900)
Respondent Countrywide Home Loans (Seth P. Waxman,
202.663.6000)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioners Larry D. and Cheryle Jesinoski
AARP, National Consumer Law Center, American Civil Liberties
Union, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Center
for Responsible Lending (Jean Constantine-Davis, 202.434.2060)
New York, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia
(Barbara D. Underwood, 212.416.8020)
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United States (Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Solicitor General,
202.514.2217)
In Support of Respondent Countrywide Home Loans
American Bankers Association, American Financial Services
Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Consumer Mortgage

Coalition, Independent Community Bankers of America, and
Mortgage Bankers Association (Kirk D. Jensen, 202.349.8048)
Professor Richard R.W. Brooks (William M. Jay, 202.346.4000)
Structured Finance Industry Group, Inc. (Frank A. Hirsch,
919.862.2200)

In October, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below we highlight some of the more engaging exchanges between the justices
and the advocates during Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk (Docket No. 13-433). That case raised the question of whether time spent in
security screenings is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Paul Clement (on behalf of the petitioners): And I think two points
to make here. One is, you know, I think the knife sharpening in
King Packing, for example, really is indispensable. You can’t run a
butchering operation without sharp knives. I think you can perfectly
well run a warehouse facility without egress security. So I think
these are different.

analogue of that. Not only do they both come at the employer’s
insistence and for the employer’s benefit, but they also have this
process of verifying that the employers are essentially behaving in
an honest way.

Justice Elena Kagan: Actually, Amazon, I don’t think you can. I
mean, what makes it Amazon? It’s a system of inventory control
that betters everybody else in the business. And what’s really
important to Amazon is that it knows where every toothbrush in the
warehouse is. And that’s just as integral to what Amazon does and
to what it requires its employees to do as, for example, the—I’m
going back to my hypos—but the person who closes out the cash
register, the person who closes out the bank teller operation, is
that this is sort of a necessary part of what the folks who do all the
stocking and the unshelving and shelving do at Amazon.

Mark Thierman (on behalf of the respondents): But there are
employers who say—they’re OCD, they want everyone there till
8 o’clock, even if you have nothing to do. I’m paying you to stay
till 8 o’clock, you stay till 8 o’clock. There’s nothing that is coming
out of that, but yet you are told to stay, so you stay. And there’s no
function to it. I mean, the employers do things like that or they do
it for reasons that we don’t know or we won’t understand and we
don’t care because that’s our system. They are allowed to run their
business that way. And a corollary of that is that they tell people
what to do. …Whatever it is, if the employer tells to you do it and
it’s not within these carveouts, it is compensable. And the drug
testing is another example. The drug testing is compensable. Why?
Because your freedom—you’re giving up your time. Your freedom
isn’t—and you’re doing it because the employer told you to do it.

Mr. Clement: Well, I guess I would beg to differ, Justice Kagan.
I think, certainly, everything in the Amazon facility is barcoded
and the like, and everybody knows where everything is, but
there’s always the possibility that somebody [did] not barcode
an incoming item at all and put it in their pocket. Now, if they’re
doing that, they’re not discharging their principal activities, and
if they’re detected on the way out, I mean, that might help keep
the next person on mission, but that doesn’t make it integral and
indispensable to discharging the primary job duty.
Justice Antonin Scalia: I suppose that it is also necessary to
Amazon’s business that it know how many hours each of its
workers has worked, so it knows how much to pay them and
doesn’t pay them more, right? And—and yet, there’s no doubt
whatever, is there, that punching in and punching out is not
preliminary and postliminary, right?
Mr. Clement: I hope there’s no doubt about that, Justice Scalia.
And I do think that the exit security screenings are just the modern
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Justice Antonin Scalia: Suppose the employer has enough stations
that it just takes a minute to go through. Would you still be making
the argument that that’s compensable?
Mr. Thierman: If the—if the employees go through in a minute,
it’s de minimis. And that’s the safety valve or the escape valve.
First, we decide if it’s work; second, we decide if it’s within the
postliminary and preliminary carveout; and third, we decide if it’s
de minimis.
Justice Scalia: Gotcha. Okay. Five minutes?
Mr. Thierman: The Ninth Circuit uses a ten-minute rule. It varies. I
mean, if it’s constantly done every day for ten minutes exactly, it
gets close. But three minutes, it’s trivial.
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